Pushing the Boundaries between Competition and Insolvency Law. Pre-packing in the UK by Schadewijk, M.A.N. van






The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 





Please be advised that this information was generated on 2019-06-02 and may be subject to
change.
(2017) 5 NIBLeJ 2 
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Matthijs VAN SCHADEWIJK* 
 
Introduction 
Competition law and insolvency law are clashing doctrines. On the one hand, 
competition policy, particularly on state aid, is often criticised for interfering with 
the restructuring process of distressed companies.1 On the other hand, a certain 
degree of distortion of competition is inherent to insolvency law, especially 
corporate rescue. Insolvent companies that go through a rescue procedure to get back 
on their feet often bypass general contract and labour law standards. This inevitably 
improves their market position and consequently gives them a certain competitive 
advantage over solvent competitors who cannot take the same route.2 A balance has 
to be struck between the conflicting interests of saving a struggling though viable 
company and the competitive advantages corporate rescue can bestow on such a 
company.3 With the advent of the ‘rescue culture’ in many European jurisdictions, 
through which more emphasis is placed on restoring struggling though viable 
companies to their healthy and profitable state, an attempt is made to overcome the 
                                                 
* PhD Candidate/Lecturer, Business and Law Research Centre, Department of Social Law, Radboud 
University Nijmegen (the Netherlands). This contribution is an adaptation of the thesis that was finalised 
in January 2017 as part of the Dual LLM Corporate and Insolvency Law/European and Insolvency Law 
at Nottingham Trent University and Radboud University Nijmegen. Whereas the thesis comprised of a 
comparative analysis of the Dutch and UK versions of the pre-pack, this contribution focuses on the UK 
variant. Nevertheless, considerations from the Dutch point of view are carried through in this contribution 
insofar as they can also be applied to the UK pre-pack. 
1 See Christoph G Paulus, ‘Competition law versus Insolvency law: When Legal Doctrines Clash’ (2013) 
18 Uniform Law Review 65, 67-72. 
2 eg Mahmoud Salem and Opal-Dawn Martin, ‘The Ethics of Using Chapter XI as a Management 
Strategy’ (1994) 13 Journal of Business Ethics 95, 99. 
3 Paulus (n 1) 76; cf Katarzyna Gromek Broc and Rebecca Parry (eds), Corporate Rescue: An Overview 
of Recent Developments (Kluwer Law International 2006) 2-3. 
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deeply-rooted European aversion towards failure.4 Consequently, the competition 
concerns traditionally ousted in the US5 may have crossed the Atlantic.  
One form of corporate rescue that has received particular attention over the last 
decade is the ‘pre-pack’. This concept, originating in the US, is explored in various 
jurisdictions and knows several forms. On the European continent, the UK pre-pack 
is undoubtedly the most famous. Essentially, the UK pre-pack involves the sale of a 
company’s business as a going concern that is prepared with a prospective 
administrator before going into the formal insolvency procedure of administration  
and executed shortly after the out of court appointment of the administrator and 
without creditor approval.6 The attraction of this business sale pre-pack7 lies with its 
speed, low costs and consequent value preservation, notably since goodwill is not 
lost due to negative publicity.8 However, pre-packs are also faced with a vast amount 
of criticism from various platforms. Pre-packs allegedly leave unsecured creditors 
empty-handed and without a say in the plan, are liable for a lower price than would 
have been obtained were the business have been exposed to the market, and facilitate 
abuse of the management by making it possible, for instance, to dismiss employees 
easily.9 
To get to the crux of the matter, competitors also increasingly express concerns that 
pre-packs harm their market position. They feel unfairly prejudiced for they believe 
the pre-pack enables a near-insolvent competing business to shed all liabilities and 
restart with a clean slate without safeguards ensuring fairness and transparency. 
Similarly, the possibility to free the business from unfavourable contracts, notably 
with employees, is widely debated. Also, certainly when the business is transferred 
to a connected party, interested competitors have allegedly been unable to make a 
bid and thus evade the consequent anticompetitive harm. These criticisms have, to a 
                                                 
4 Exemplary is the Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on preventive restructuring frameworks, second chance and measures to increase the efficiency of 
restructuring, insolvency and discharge procedures and amending Directive 2012/30/EU, COM(2016) 
723 final. 
5 See eg n 2. 
6 Schedule B1 of the Insolvency Act (‘IA’) 1986 para’s 3(1) and (3), 14(1) and 22(1)-(2); as explicitly 
allowed ex eg Re T & D Industries Plc [2000] BCC 956 (Ch); see also DKLL Solicitors v Her Majesty 
Revenue and Customs [2007] EWHC 2067 (Ch). 
7 Which is henceforth the definition of pre-pack used in this contribution. 
8 eg Vanessa Finch, Corporate Insolvency: Perspective and Principles (CUP 2009) 456-457. 
9 See the research on pre-packs conducted for the UK government concluded in 2014; Teresa Graham, 
‘Graham Review into Pre-pack Administration - Report to The Rt Hon Vince Cable MP’, June 2014, 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/graham-review-into-pre-pack-administration> accessed 
26 November 2017 (‘Graham Report’). 
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minor extent, been picked up by the legislature as well as in literature.10 Yet, it seems 
this recognition has so far had little influence on the development of the pre-pack. 
This contribution investigates whether the pre-pack, as a flagship of business rescue, 
can distort competition to an unjustifiable extent to the effect that the balance 
between competition and insolvency law is jeopardised. First, the assessment 
framework is shaped. Then, the anticompetitive elements of the pre-pack are 
analysed. Afterwards, said findings and the discussed theoretical considerations on 
anti-competitiveness are brought together to conclude whether, and if so, to what 
extent, pre-packs can be disproportionately anticompetitive and jeopardise the 
balance between competition and insolvency law. 
The Competition Framework 
There are diverging theories on what constitutes anticompetitive behaviour and 
justifying factors.11 Crucially, much disagreement exists on what precise objectives 
should be pursued by competition law and to what extent governments should 
interfere in the natural competition process. On the one hand, the ordo-liberal school 
of thought12 advocates an ordered market in which the state plays an active role. The 
benefits of self-regulated markets are denied and social, democratic principles and 
humanist values such as fairness or even happiness are centralised. A degree of 
morally justifiable economic (and political) freedom is to be maintained and all 
citizens should have the freedom to compete.13 In this view, any corporate rescue 
procedure is anticompetitive. Improving the debtor’s ability to compete is inherent 
to corporate rescue. Consequently, at least from a ‘moral’ standpoint, so is 
                                                 
10 eg House of Commons Business and Enterprise Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2008-09, 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200809/cmselect/cmberr/198/198.pdf> (‘BEC Sixth 
Report 2008-09’) accessed 26 September 2017 11, Ev 53 (Jonathan Williams); Response submitted by 
the British Printing Industries Federation (‘BPIF’) to the Consultation of the Insolvency Service 
<http://www.britishprint.com/downloads/managed/industry_info/Prepacks_consultation_doc_plus_appe
ndix.pdf> accessed 26 September 2017 (‘BPIF Response) Q25; Andrew Brown, ‘Printers, pre-packs and 
practitioner’s fees’ (2014 Winter) Recovery 43. 
11 For an overview, see G Monti, EC Competition Law (CUP 2007) ch 2. The substantive (EU/UK) 
competition rules are not discussed here, as they do not form a safeguard against potentially 
anticompetitive pre-packs. Under the merger control rules, a high degree of market power is required for 
a concentration to be deemed to impede the Internal Market significantly (eg Guidelines on the assessment 
of horizontal mergers under the Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings 
[2004] OJ C031 (‘Horizontal Guidelines’) para 18). Even though the pre-packing or acquiring firm might 
hold a considerable market share when the pre-pack is effected, this is clearly not what the criticism is 
aimed at. It  is aimed at using insolvency law to gain a competitive advantage by obtaining a clean slate 
under favourable terms. 
12 This philosophy was established as a reaction to the totalitarian thinking of the Nazi regime. It has had 
a major impact, inter alia, on competition law globally; Angela Wigger, Competition for Competitiveness: 
The Politics of the Transformation of the EU Competition Regime  (PhD Thesis, Universiteit van 
Amsterdam, 2008) 63-65. 
13 D Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Clarendon Press 
1998) 237-241. 
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undermining the competitive freedom of competitors.14 On the other hand, an ordo-
liberal policy may also be inclined to safeguard the failing company’s freedom to 
compete. The crucial question would be whether, from a moral point of view, the 
corporate rescue procedure disproportionately incentivises rescue with too little 
regard for competitors. In the same vein, other public policies, such as social, 
employment and industrial policies, may also be taken into account in competition 
law.15 If such considerations are taken into account, the element of employment can 
be regarded as an important factor in deciding whether pre-packs are unjustifiably 
anticompetitive. Notably, if a competitor suffers economic losses because of the 
insolvent’s rise out of the ashes, the jobs lost with that competitor might outweigh 
or negate those preserved with the insolvent by the rescue procedure.16 
Alternatively, more or complete emphasis may be placed on economic 
considerations. This line of thought can for example be found in the illustrious 
Chicago School17 and advocates that the pursuit of welfare through economic 
efficiency18 should be the predominant or sole goal of competition law. The state 
should not interfere if companies acquire a high degree of market power solely for 
the sake of fairness, but only if this affects the relevant product market to the extent 
that it economically harms consumers and/or producers. Along the same lines, 
economically inefficient firms should not be protected if this is not in the interest of 
economic welfare.19 
As there appears to be no data on the economic effects of the pre-pack on competitors 
and/or consumers, the criticism of competitors seems to stem from a more ordo -
liberal point of view. Nevertheless, it has been put forward that competitors on a 
market with overcapacity suffered economic harm due to a pre-pack, which is 
exemplified by the consequent employment losses suffered by those companies.20  
If an economic approach is taken, the assessment of the pre-pack would depend on 
the type of welfare pursued. If consumer welfare is the standard, it has to be shown, 
on a case-by-case basis, that the pre-pack leads to consumer harm before it can be 
labelled as anticompetitive. If social welfare is pursued, the economic effects on 
consumers has to be balanced with those on producers. Moreover, the (long-term) 
                                                 
14 cf Brown (n 10) 43 and Paulus (n 1) 75. 
15 See eg M Furse, Antitrust Law in China, Korea and Vietnam (OUP 2009) Ch 1-1 and 2-1. 
16 Brown (n 10) 43; BPIF Response (n 10) Q25. 
17 The Chicago School of Antitrust emerged in the 1950s and has since been rather dominant in the US.  
18 For an in-depth discussion on the different meanings of the terms welfare and economic efficiency see 
Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases and Materials (5th edn, OUP 2014) 
12. 
19 ibid 18; cf text to n 29-30 infra. 
20 Brown (n 10) 43; see also Peter Walton, ‘When is Pre-packaged Administration Appropriate? – A 
Theoretical Consideration’ (2011) 20 NLJ 1, 8-9 and BJ T ideman, ‘Kritische kanttekeningen bij de pre-
pack’ (2013) 6 FIP 190, 191. 
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economic efficiencies of the acquisition can be brought forward to justify the initial 
anticompetitive effects. In this light, it must be noted that pre-packs can undoubtedly 
have a positive effect on the market and consumers. A known premise of competition 
law is that removing a firm from the market may upset the market structure to the 
extent that a merger would be less detrimental to the market, even if it leads to 
considerable market power.21 As a viable business is kept on the market, the 
competitor harm may constitute no more than a retention of or an increase in 
competition that leads to lower prices, consumer surplus and economic welfare. 
However, this is not by definition the case. Firstly, whereas the increased market  
power of the buyer may not be anticompetitive at the start, this may change in the 
long term. For example, in a market with few players a small player can quickly  
become dominant after the acquisition if he is innovative.22 A pre-pack can constitute 
the source of such innovation, as it enables a distressed player to continue with a 
clean slate with a business that is already established on the market.23 Secondly, an 
accessible business rescue procedure may incentivise or force other market players 
to do the same. Certainly on small markets or markets with overcapacity, competitors 
may have to resort to similar mechanisms to avoid their own market exit.24 If such 
impetus is given, the acceptance of failure may in the end overshadow the rewards 
of success. Furthermore, if a precedent is set for any firms suffering at the hands of 
their competitors to do the same, this may result in companies partaking in riskier 
behaviour, whilst simultaneously removing the incentive for directors to enhance the 
competitiveness of their companies. This  would, ultimately, decrease competition 
and subsequently efficiency and welfare.25 
At this point in time, one can only speculate on these matters, as there is no data on 
the economic effects of pre-packs. Nevertheless, a third and arguably more 
substantial aspect in this regard is the future viability of the rescued business. 
Rescuing a business that lacks future viability goes against the Darwinian process of 
competition26 and is in line with neither ordo-liberal nor economic considerations. 
Consequent failure of a (pre-packaged) business is not only to the detriment of 
                                                 
21 See further the text to n 29-30 infra. 
22 Also SH de Ranitz, ‘De voortzetting van de onderneming tijdens insolventie, nu en straks’, in NED 
Faber and others (eds), De bewindvoerder, een octopus (Kluwer 2008) 192. 
23 ibid 192-193. 
24 Salem and Martin (n 2) 29; a recent example of this risk constitutes the pre-pack of costs firm Just Costs 
Ltd and the near simultaneous shutdown of competitor Cost Advocates Ltd, 
<https://www.litigationfutures.com/news/jackson-effect-one-costs-firm-set-close-another-leaves-debt-
behind-administrator-sale> accessed 15 November 2017. 
25 Also De Ranitz (n 22) 99; Brad Johnson, BR Baliga and John D Blair, ‘Chapter 11: Strategic Advantage 
and Social Anathema?’ (1986) 5 Journal of Business Ethics 51, 59. 
26 eg Finch (n 8) 456. 
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creditors who may be hit with a ‘double whammy’27 and employees who may (again) 
be dismissed, but also to competition as the company, despite all concessions made 
and after potentially harming competitors, will leave the market and thus, normally , 
decrease competition.28 
Moreover, even if the outcome of a pre-pack is beneficial to consumers, there may  
have been an alternative solution that could have achieved the same gains but with 
less competitor harm. For example, the European merger control rules acknowledge 
that an anticompetitive merger may have fewer anticompetitive effects than the 
counterfactual of removing the firm from the market.29 Nevertheless, there are 
several conditions attached to this ‘failing firm defence’ that are interpreted strictly 
by the Commission. Notably, the failing firm has far-reaching responsibilities in 
researching whether a less detrimental merger is possible.30 Thus, while the benefits 
of a pre-pack may outweigh its  anticompetitive effects at first glance, the availability  
of a less anticompetitive alternative may negate this justification.  
As the main advantage of pre-packs is the preservation of value, it is submitted that 
the economic effects of the pre-pack on competition are predominant in discussing 
whether pre-packs can be unjustifiably anticompetitive. Therefore, the following  
three sections discuss to what extent pre-packs may give an economic advantage 
over competitors. The risk that the sale process leads to competitor harm is assessed 
first. Secondly, it is examined how ongoing contractual relationships may be dealt 
with. Thirdly, the special position of employees is examined. Finally, in this section 
it was argued that considerations of future viability and a comparison with the 
counterfactual are of great importance in deciding whether the market distortion can 
be justified. Before an answer is given to the central question, these elements are 
applied to the pre-pack as well. 
The Risk of a Suboptimal Sale 
The Relevance of the Sale Price 
Undoubtedly the most often voiced criticism of the UK pre-pack is that the business 
is sold, without influence of the unsecured creditors and the court, for a suboptimal 
                                                 
27 Sandra Frisby, A Preliminary Analysis of Pre-Packaged Administrations, Report to The Association of 
Business Recovery Professionals, August 2007, 74. 
28 Walton (n 20) 7-8; BPIF Response (n 10) Q25. 
29 Horizontal Guidelines (n 11) Section VIII; also see OECD Competition Committee, Roundtable on 
FFD of 21 October 2009, DAF/COMP(2009)38, Contribution of the European Commission (‘OECD 
Roundtable’) 183-188. 
30 ibid 184. 
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price.31 This leads to a relatively high degree of debts being left behind and is 
consequently at the expense of the returns to the (unsecured) creditors.32 As said in 
the introduction, this is also to the detriment of competitors for several reasons. If 
the purchaser buys the business for a market-conforming33 price, there is in principle 
little to no market-distorting effect as the price paid represents the value of the 
business.34 However, if a going concern business, which is thus already active on the 
market,35 can be bought free of debt for a price that is not market-conforming and 
thus does not represent the value of the business, the purchaser is given a competitive 
advantage over its competitors as he does not have to maximally invest in the going 
concern. 
The effect of being able to buy a business cheaply is particularly noticeable in 
connected-party36 sales. Under such a construction, not only does the same business 
re-enter the market free of debt, but also essentially the same company and possibly 
under the direction of the same management. Besides a potential lack of investment, 
the debts of essentially the same company are thus left behind and the company can 
continue with a clean slate. Consequently, the company is given a competitive 
advantage over its competitors who must continue to have to carry their own debts.37 
This is also the focus of the criticism from competitors.38 Nevertheless, even if the 
sale is made to a connected party, if the purchaser pays a market-conforming price 
this reduces the market-distorting effect as the debts are (partly) paid off.39 The 
question is how much debt is left behind and this is thus influenced by the sale price. 
Debts left behind can include sums payable to the Crown40 and fines received for, 
inter alia, breaches of competition law. The shedding of such public debts constitutes 
a particular competitive advantage as this is normally impossible under general 
                                                 
31 eg JM Wood, Corporate Rescue: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamentals and Existence (PhD Thesis, 
The University of Leeds, 2013) 210; Bo Xie, ‘Role of Insolvency Practitioners in the UK Pre-pack 
Administrations: Challenges and Control’ (2012) 21 International Insolvency Review 85, 92.  
32 eg Steven Davies, ‘Pre-Pack – He Who Pays the Piper Calls the Tune’ (2006 Summer) Recovery 16, 
17. 
33 This can also be referred to as going concern or market value; see further S Mason, ‘Pre-packs from the 
valuer’s perspective’ (2006 Summer) Recovery 19, 20. 
34 Also FMJ Verstijlen, ‘Reorganisatie van ondernemingen en prepack’, in D Busch et al, Wet continuïteit 
ondernemingen (delen I en II) en het bestuursverbod: Preadvies van de Vereeniging 'Handelsrecht' (Paris 
2014) 27-28. 
35 As opposed to spare assets or a start-up company. 
36 Such as the management or a secured creditor; cf Statement of Insolvency Practice 16 (‘SIP 16’) 
<https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/technical_library/SIPS/SIP%2016%20Version%203%20Nov
%202015.pdf> accessed 26 September 2017 Appendix and Catherine Shuttleworth, ‘Pre-packs: the latest 
wave of reform’ (April 2015) Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 61, 63. 
37 eg Brown (n 10) 41. 
38 eg BEC Sixth Report 2008-09 (n 10) Ev 53. 
39 Also Verstijlen (n 34) 27-28. 
40 See s251 EA 2002, which abolished the Crown Preference; see the Cork Report (Insolvency Law and 
Practice: Report of the Review Committee) Cmnd 8558 (1982) at para 1409.  
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contract law.41 Moreover, in cases where a new company is set up for that purpose 
and the business is bought cheaply, the barriers to entry of the market are 
circumvented.42 Lastly, the competitor harm is strengthened further if those 
competitors did not have the opportunity to bid for the business and thus evade the 
consequent competitor harm. 
Position of Secured Creditors and Connected-Party Sales 
At the heart of the debt-shedding criticism lays the strong position of secured 
creditors in the UK pre-packing process43 that is given by the generally creditor-
friendly UK insolvency system44 as well as in practice. Firstly, the consent of the 
secured creditors is necessary to sell the encumbered assets45 as the alternative route 
of seeking the court’s leave is too time-costly.46 Due to the over-collateralisation of 
assets, which entails that the value of the security given exceeds the value of the 
debt, as is commonly occurring in the UK,47 such consent will often be required for 
(nearly) all assets. Moreover, the consent of the qualified floating charge holder will 
often be required to ensure it does not upset the company’s appointment of the 
administrator.48 Furthermore, the availability of funding throughout the process is 
crucial to the success of the pre-pack.49 Secured creditors, specifically banks, are 
generally willing to continue financing the business if there is a prospect that they 
will receive (nearly) all of the outstanding debts due to them out of the business sale 
and their full loan will be repaid in the end.50 Lastly, much of the work during the 
pre-administration period is carried out by turnaround professionals, who are, it 
appears, often appointed at the prompting of the banks.51 These considerations leave 
the secured creditors with a considerable level of control and assured returns, which 
                                                 
41 cf PJ Omar, ‘Thoughts on the Purpose of Corporate Rescue’ (1997) 12(4) Journal of International 
Banking Law 127, 130. 
42 On this, see further Jones and Sufrin (n 18) 85. 
43 cf Alexandra Kastrinou, European Corporate Insolvency Law: an analysis of the corporate rescue laws 
of France, Greece and the United Kingdom (PhD Thesis, Leicester School of Law, 2010) 243. 
44 eg Finch (n 8) 277; for example, directors are distrusted and therefore the managerial and oversight 
functions are normally given to an IP and/or the court to ensure a fair and equitable process for all 
creditors. 
45 Schedule B1 IA para’s 70-74. 
46 J Armour, ‘The Rise of the Pre-Pack: Corporate Restructuring in the UK and Proposals for Reform’, in 
RP Austin and FJG Aoun (eds), Restructuring Companies in Troubled Times: Director and Creditor 
Perspectives (Ross Parsons Centre 2012) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2093134> accessed 26 September 2017 16. 
47 WE Moojen, ‘Banken ook bij pre-pack bepalend voor uitkomst’ FD 18 September 2014. 
48 Schedule B1 IA 1986 para’s 14, 26(1)(b); Armour (n 46) 16. 
49 Also eg SV Vullings, A Comparative Analysis of the Pre-pack in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands (Celsus juridische uitgeverij 2015) 48. 
50 Christopher Mallon and Shai Y Waisman (eds), The Law and Practice of Restructuring in the UK and 
US (OUP 2011) 237-238. 
51 Vullings (n 49) 39. 
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makes the pre-pack a compelling rescue procedure for them.52 Consequently, it has 
been argued that, as a tool to enforce their security to gain maximum returns, banks 
may prompt53 the distressed company to research the pre-pack option.54 
Furthermore, due to the negative effects of public marketing55 the buyer is regularly 
found in a connected party such as a secured creditor or the existing management, 
which is thus regularly done in collaboration with (or at the prompting of) the 
financers. A new company (‘NewCo’) is often set up for the purpose of buying the 
business56 that is the same as the old company (‘OldCo’) all but in name57 and 
generally led by the same management. Moreover, although independent valuation 
is common to the pre-pack,58 this is usually no more than a desk-top valuation, i.e. 
with limited information, only. Furthermore, in a connected-party sale the purchase 
price often exactly matches this figure.59 Consequently, the valuation and the 
resulting sale price have been found to be merely an indication of the price the 
connected party is willing to pay,60 or even to constitute an equation with the amount 
of secured debt.61 Interestingly, Graham indeed found that returns to unsecured 
creditors were indeed lower in case of connected-party sales.62 
However, it is recognised that connected-party sales can be commercially and 
economically justifiable. An alternative buyer may simply be unavailable. For 
example, as Xie notes, if the distress is due to industry-wide factors, competitors 
might also be affected and not desire to expand.63 Moreover, connected parties, 
especially the management, might be willing to pay a higher price due to the business 
                                                 
52 Alexandra Kastrinou, ‘An Analysis of the Pre-Pack Technique and Recent Developments in the Area’ 
(2008) Company Lawyer 262; Moojen (n 47); cf Peter Walton, ‘Pre-packaged Administrations – Trick or 
Treat?’ (2006) 19(8) Insolvency Intelligence 113, 116, 121, who argues this leaves the secured creditors 
with more control than was possible even under the old-style administrative receivership procedure; also 
see the statistics in this regard in Sandra Frisby, ‘The Pre-pack Promise: Signs of Fulfilment?’ (Spring 
2010) Recovery 30. 
53 The bank will want to avoid direct association with the failing company; Vullings (n 49) 49. 
54 eg Davies (n 32) 17. 
55 See text to n 8 supra. 
56 Also known as ‘management buy-outs’ (‘MBOs’); Graham finds that 63.3% of pre-packaged sales were 
to a connected party in 2010; Graham Report (n 9) 37; similarly Sandra Frisby, ‘Insolvency Law and 
Insolvency Practice: Principles and Pragmatism Diverge?’ (2011) 64 Current Legal Problems 349, 377. 
57 Though a definite resemblance is often seen to retain brand identity; see s216 IA 1986 and Rule 4.228 
Insolvency Rules 1986 with regard to the use of a ‘prohibited name’, i.e. a name that is the same or very 
similar to the name of the insolvent company; Frisby (n 56) 382-383. 
58 Graham Report (n 9) 48. 
59 ibid 9. 
60 Kastrinou (n 43) 104-105; Crispin Daly and Sarah Wakely, ‘Impacts of the Graham Review into Pre-
pack Administration in the UK’ [2015] ICR 403, 405; Graham Report (n 9) 48. 
61 Moojen (n 47); Graham Report (n 9) 48. 
62 Graham Report (n 9) 40. 
63 Xie (n 31) 92; see further Michael Crystal and Riz Mokal, ‘The Valuation of Distressed Companies’ – 
a Conceptual Framework’ (2006) Bepress Legal Series Working Paper 1370 
<http://law.bepress.com/expresso/eps/1370/> accessed 26 September 2017, 3. 
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having special value to them or their knowledge and human capital adding value to 
the business, which may also facilitate the attraction of funding.64 In that light, if the 
cause of the failure cannot be attributed to them, the retention of the existing  
management can be desirable.65 Nevertheless, other potential buyers factor the risk 
coming with the lack of information, mainly due to the inability to value the 
goodwill, in the price.66 Therefore, the contention that connected parties are often 
willing to pay the highest price is unsurprising and no insurance that the highest 
value has been obtained. Moreover, statistics show that unsecured creditors do not 
on average fare worse in a pre-pack than in a ‘standard’ business sale out of 
administration.67 However, the issue does not lay with the low returns for unsecured 
creditors, as this is inherent to insolvency,68 but with the fact that unsecured creditors 
do not share in the added value generated by the pre-pack (the ‘pre-pack surplus’).69 
As secrecy and subsequently such a surplus is one of the big advantages of the pre-
pack, this surplus should be reflected in the sale price. However, if the business is 
undersold, the (likely connected party) purchaser obtains the pre-pack surplus in the 
form of a discount. Also, the secured lender may demand a fee for the restructuring. 
This fee is then factored in the new loan, representing the lender’s share of the 
surplus.70 Thus, it is submitted that the inherence to insolvency of low returns for 
unsecured creditors does not silence the criticism. Moreover, the stance of the banks 
may put the transferring parties in a better position to secure credit from existing or 
new lenders, albeit at higher rates, as the transferred business, having disposed of 
the (unsecured) debts, has a clean slate.71 This leads to another competitive 
advantage. Furthermore, transferring the pre-pack surplus from the creditors to the 
purchaser or its financer(s) gives the purchaser another competitive advantage. This 
is further discussed below. 
Role of the Administrator 
It follows from what was discussed above, and because court supervision is normally 
absent in the UK pre-pack,72 that the role of the (prospective) administrator is crucial 
                                                 
64 Armour (n 46) 16; Frisby (n 56) 384-385. 
65 But cf M Hyde and I White, ‘Pre-Packed Administrations: Unwrapped’ (2009) Law and Financial 
Markets Review 134. 
66 MHF Van Vugt, ‘De Nederlandse prepack: time-out, please!’ (2014) 47 FIP 27. 
67 Frisby (n 52) 30; Graham Report (n 9) 32. 
68 cf The Insolvency Service, Report on the first six months’ operation of statement of insolvency practise 
16, 2009, <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/301183/sip16-
first_six_months_2009.pdf> accessed 26 September 2017, 8. 
69 Armour (n 46) 18-19. 
70 Idem. 
71 eg S Sherman, ‘Bankruptcy’s Spreading Blight’ (1991) 11 Fortune 123. 
72 See (n 13). This is unique in Europe and may explain why the criticism from the competition side is 
particularly present in the UK pre-pack. 
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in ensuring a fair and equitable pre-pack process for all creditors.73 However, among 
other concerns as regards his position,74 doubts have been expressed as regards the 
influence of the (prospective) administrator in the pre-pack process. Administrators 
often justify the pre-pack by referring to the benefits of connected-party sales.75 They 
often also point to the lack of funding, which seems to indicate that secured lenders 
can pressure the administrator to choose a pre-pack. In the interests of creditor wealth 
maximisation,76 the administrator will then have no choice but to agree to the sale, 
as the alternative, without the cooperation of the secured creditors, is liquidation.77 
Consequently, the administrator may not always be in a position to research whether 
an alternative route, for example a different purchaser or a normal marketing process 
with open market exposure, is more suitable.78 This is also the main reason that 
public policy considerations – including potential competition considerations – 
currently do not, and in practice cannot, play a substantial role in the considerations 
of the administrator.79 
Nevertheless, the dominant position of the secured creditors in the pre-pack process 
does not leave the administrator wholly powerless.80 The requirements of the 
practice rules as laid down in Statement of Insolvency Practice (‘SIP’) 16 aim to 
ensure (and often reassure) the unsecured creditors that their rights have not been 
prejudiced and that the business has been sold at the highest reasonably possible 
price.81 SIP 16 obliges the administrator to disclose, within seven days after the 
completion of the sale, a specific set of information to all creditors. Importantly, this 
information has to disclose in detail how the valuation was conducted, why the price 
was the highest reasonably obtainable and how marketing was conducted, or, if there 
was no marketing or valuation, a justifying explanation. Notably, this may constitute 
ammunition for creditors to challenge the pre-pack or the actions of the management 
or the administrator.82 Since the first iteration of SIP 16 in 2009, familiarity of 
                                                 
73 eg Kastrinou (n 52) 262; see eg Vullings (n 49) 38 on who can be an administrator. 
74 See generally eg Xie (n 31) 93, Frisby (n 27) 2, and Graham Report (n 9) 39. 
75 Frisby (n 56) 388-389. 
76 Which is the interest he has to serve; Schedule B1 IA 1986 para 3(2). 
77 Armour (n 46) 17; Frisby (n 56) 389. 
78 This is further discussed below. 
79 For example, an administrator refusing to sanction a market-conforming, going concern sale on the 
basis that there would be a considerable distortion of competition would run the risk of being held liable 
by the creditors of the OldCo; cf Vanessa Finch, ‘Corporate rescue: who is interested’ (2012) 3 Journal 
of Business Law 190, 212. 
80 See generally the fiduciary duties of directors with regard to self-dealing, which are complied with if 
certain disclosures have been made; ss175(3) and 177 CA 2006. 
81 SIP 16 para 17; preferably on the first  notification prior to the creditors’ meeting; Re Hellas 
Telecommunications (Luxembourg) II SCA [2009] EWHC 3199 (Ch), [2010] BCC 295; SIP 16 has been 
amended considerably since its coming into existence in 2009 and the practice conditions are arguably 
still in their infancy. 
82 This is further discussed below. 
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administrators with the system has visibly grown and one may optimistically  
conclude that, in the majority of pre-packs, the given statements comply with the 
requirements.83 For example, online market places are used to contact potentially 
interested parties.84 
 
However, several criticisms have been cast over this system of ex post-transparency. 
In general, it gives the administrator a lot of freedom during the silent process as he 
is merely obliged to ‘comply or explain’ and only after the sale has been effected. 
This aligns with the flexible approach of the UK that leaves companies the freedom 
to use the approach that best suits them and to thus deviate from general p rinciples 
if necessary, as long as they explain why.85 Due to the inherent complexity of 
insolvency situations, this flexibility is hard to scrutinise. For example, the 
administrator is obliged to give clarity about the alternative options considered in his 
SIP 16 report.86 As aforementioned, he can easily justify the choice to pre-pack by 
referring to the bank’s stance on the matter. Similarly, SIP 16 obliges the 
administrator to explain he acted within the purpose of administration.87 It has been 
argued that the first statutory objective of administration, entity rescue, is never 
contemplated by the administrator; he has worked for weeks on the pre-pack and 
when coming into office he is unlikely to consider entity rescue.88 This duty too 
seems complied with when the secured lenders make clear no further funding will 
be available for the OldCo.89  
Secondly, as aforementioned, the independent valuations common to a pre-pack are 
usually desk-top valuations only, and in a connected-party sale the purchase price 
often exactly matches this figure. Graham found there were rarely any explanations 
as to the valuation methods used. Crucially, whereas the preservation of value of 
intangible assets was often used to justify the pre-pack, she found that most 
valuations were limited to certain tangible assets and did not involve intellectual 
property or goodwill of the business.90 Therefore, it is arguably hard to prove the 
pre-pack has in fact retained the value of these publicity-sensitive intangibles. 
                                                 
83 For the development of these rates see Nils Elner, ‘The End of Pre-packs? An Analysis of the Legal 
Landscape in which Pre-packs Operate and the Failures of Graham’s Proposals – Part Two’ (2016) ICR 
165, 167-169. 
84 R Mulder, ‘De Pre-pack: verkoop en voortzetting in stilte, verantwoording in het openbaar. Een 
bespreking van de concept praktijkregels van Insolad’ (2015) 5 TvI 28, 32; eg <business-sale.com> and 
<www.ip-bid.com>. 
85 eg Graham Report (n 9) 12. 
86 SIP 16 para 16. 
87 ibid para 9. 
88 Walton (n 52) 116; cf Kastrinou (n 52) 259. 
89 Armour (n 46) 20. 
90 Graham Report (n 9) 48. 
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Thirdly, Graham found that administrators often wholly refrain from marketing and 
in cases were marketing was carried out there was often no evidence for when 
marketing was carried out nor for how long.91 Moreover, in several pre-packs no 
other potential buyer other than the existing management or secured lenders had been 
sought, by both the management and the administrator.92 Even though she 
acknowledges that transparent marketing is simply not a possibility in some cases,93 
Graham recognised a vivid danger in the administrator rely ing solely on the 
information provided by the management and thus possibly the buyer.94 
Due to these criticisms, further valuation and marketing requirements were 
introduced. Notably, the ‘pre-pack pool’, consisting of a group of experienced  
businessmen, was installed to ensure independent scrutiny of the pre-pack before its 
execution but with minimal harmful public exposure.95 The administrator has to 
encourage a connected party to approach the pool before the sale. The pool 
subsequently issues a statement on the proposed sale after scrutinising whether the 
sale in all its aspects is reasonable.96 Its task thus includes assessing whether the 
connected party is reasonably the best buyer and the intended sale price is reasonably 
the highest obtainable sale price. The statement is not binding and the decision to 
pre-pack remains with the administrator, though the usual ‘comply-or-explain’ rule 
applies.97 The inaugural report from the pre-pack pool indicates that one-in-four 
connected-party pre-packs is now submitted for independent scrutiny by the pool. 
Moreover, since the instalment of the pool the number of (connected -party) pre-
packs have dropped, even when compared to the drop in administrations generally.98  
Thus, the reforms introduced in 2015 may have decreased the popularity of the 
(connected-party) pre-pack. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the new valuation and 
marketing requirements, specifically the pre-pack pool, remains widely debated. The 
idea of further enhancing marketing obligations is criticised as the possibility to 
deviate from these general principles continues to exist and explanations to that 
effect remain hard to scrutinise.99 The same goes for the pre-pack pool and it is feared 
that the ‘bad apples’ will simply not approach the pool.100 As only one out of four 
                                                 
91 Graham Report (n 9) 45-47; see also Daly and Wakely (n 60) 405. 
92 eg Frisby (n 27) 71. 
93 Graham Report (n 9) 44. 
94 Idem. 
95 The pool became effective on 2 November 2015, one day after the latest SIP 16. 
96 Graham Report (n 9) 59. 
97 ibid 62; Daly and Wakely (n 60) 406. 
98 Pre Pack Pool Annual Review 2016, March 2017, <https://www.prepackpool.co.uk/> accessed 26 
September 2017, 5-6. 
99 Daly and Wakely (n 60) 407. 
100 Philip Reynolds and Lee Manning, ‘Pre-packaged Sales in Administrations: Statement of Insolvency 
Practice 16 (‘SIP 16’)’ (2016) ICR 1, 3. 
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connected-party pre-packs are currently referred to the pool, this possibility cannot 
be ruled out. Moreover, the authority of the pool is questioned, as the participants 
are not necessarily experienced with pre-packs and only have half a day to consider 
the irksome balance between effective rescue and creditor protection. Therefore, the 
scrutiny of the pool may not be as intrusive as it seems.101 On the other hand, 
approaching the pool may prove more compulsory as it seems and the advice of the 
pool might turn out to be binding in practice. The UK Government has granted itself 
the power to enact regulations covering, inter alia, pre-packs to connected parties.102 
Consequently, it may ban such pre-packs if Graham’s recommendations are not 
followed to a satisfactory extent. This may cause administrators to feel obliged to 
reject the pre-pack if there is no pool clearance. Alternatively, this may be another 
incentive for connected parties not to approach the pool at all, inter alia because 
negative advice may constitute strong legal ammunition for unsecured creditors.103 
The working of the pool can thus develop in several ways that may prove crucial for 
the further development of the pre-pack in the UK, and this should therefore be 
closely monitored. 
Legal Protection 
Besides the existence of safeguards in the pre-pack process, it is also of importance 
to assess whether, if the (unsecured) creditors believe their interests have been 
disenfranchised, these safeguards can be successfully enforced to ensure the highest 
reasonably possible value has been obtained.104 If the transaction can be reversed, 
this nullifies the competitor harm. If liability can be imposed on either the 
management or the administrator, this is an incentive for the management and the 
administrator to pursue an optimal sale price. Only the most relevant grounds of 
liability are discussed here.105 
Firstly, creditors may file for a breach of duty of the administrator to act in the 
interests of the creditors as a whole106 or on the basis of unfair harm to one or more 
creditors107 if they believe the sale price was not reasonably the highest obtainable. 
However, the court, which is not specialised in insolvency cases, is generally 
unwilling to interfere with the business judgments of administrators.108 
                                                 
101 See Shuttleworth (n 36) 63 and ibid 2-3. 
102 See the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015. 
103 Elner (n 83) 170-171. 
104 cf Armour (n 46) 19; Frisby (n 56) 390.  
105 For an overview see ibid 8-9, 19-25. 
106 Schedule B1 IA 1986 para 3(2), 75(3)(c); Re Charnley Davies Ltd (No 2) [1990] BCLC 760, 775. 
107 Schedule B1 IA 1986 para 74. 
108 Rebecca Parry, Corporate Rescue (Sweet & Maxwell 2008) 46; Re T & D Industries (n 6); Re Transbus 
International Ltd [2004] EWHC 932 (Ch); see recently Capital For Enterprise Fund A LP and another v 
Bibby Financial Services Limited [2015] EWHC 2593 (Ch); also cf Re Hellas (n 81) [7]. 
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Consequently, such challenges are regarded as having little chance of success unless 
there is clear undervalue; there appears to be no record of an administrator ever being 
held liable for his actions in a pre-pack.109 The same goes for a challenge based on 
the contention that no alternative to the pre-pack has been pursued.110 As noted 
above, administrators can justify this with relative ease by referring to the stance of 
the banks. Moreover, as this is framed as a subjective duty, the administrator enjoys 
a great margin of discretion.111 Consequently, it is extremely hard if not impossible 
to challenge the transaction itself.112 Similarly, a creditor filing for a breach of duty 
of the directors to act in the interests of the creditors 113 has to prove his returns in 
the pre-pack were worse than would have been if a different route than the pre-pack 
would have been pursued.114 Moreover, undervalue must still be shown, as well as a 
tangible interest in the company.115 This entails that the going concern value must 
surpass the amount of (secured) debt, which is unlikely.116 
Paragraph 88 of Schedule B1, under which a removal application for the 
administrator can be made, does arguably provide unsecured creditors with some 
power. In Clydesdale v Smailes,117 the court considered that the administrator had 
been too intimately involved in the negotiations and was therefore unable to conduct 
an independent review. Nevertheless, such cases are rare and support of informed, 
secured creditors seems necessary for such a removal prior to the sale.118 Moreover, 
the new administrator will have even less time to get to know the business, which 
arguably only enhances the odds he will agree with a ready-made deal. 
All in all, unsecured creditors seem to enjoy little legal protection against pre-packs. 
Nevertheless, as noted above, the newest SIP 16 requirements, specifically the 
involvement of the pre-pack pool, may provide the creditors with strong 
ammunition. However, due to the hesitance of the court to intervene with the 
commercial practices of administrators, SIP 16 reports have not been of much help 
to unsatisfied creditors so far.119 Therefore, a change of approach of courts is 
arguably necessary before SIP 16 will effectively play a role in supporting creditors’ 
claims as an incentive to reach an optimal sale price. Alternatively, disciplinary  
                                                 
109 Frisby (n 56) 391; Wood (n 31) 192; Armour (n 46) 8, 21. 
110 eg Re T & D Industries Plc (n 6); Re Transbus International Ltd (n 108); Wood (n 31) 192. 
111 Armour (n 46) 20. 
112 As is possible ex Schedule B1 IA 1986 para 74(3). 
113 s172 CA 2006; eg Kinsela v Russell Kinsela [1986] 4 NSWLR 722 (CA) 730; Armour (n 46) 22. 
114 See eg Re Welfab Engineers [1990] BCC 600 (Ch) 604; also see eg West Mercia Safetywear v Dodd 
[1988] BCLC 250 (CA). 
115 See Armour (n 46) 22. 
116 cf Graham Report (n 9) 30 and Re Bluebrook Ltd [2009] EWHC 2114 (Ch), [2010] BCLC 338. 
117 Clydesdale Financial Services v Smailes [2009] EWHC 1745 (Ch), [2009] BCC 810. 
118 Xie (n 31) 99. 
119 Armour (n 46) 20-21. 
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actions against the administrator may be requested. Such action may follow from a 
serious breach and can result in either a fine or withdrawal of the license of the 
administrator.120 Following one of Graham’s proposals, the supervision of SIP 16 
statements has been transferred from the Insolvency Service to the insolvency 
practitioner’s Recognised Professional Bodies (‘RPBs’), to which complaints can be 
made. This is a necessary alternative to the costly court route and has been argued to 
increase the likelihood of disciplinary actions for administrators who fail to 
comply.121 Yet, it will have to be seen in practice whether this gives unsecured 
creditors a more realistic chance of enforcement and is thus an effective deterring 
mechanism. 
Interim Conclusion 
The risk that in a pre-pack the business is not sold at the highest reasonably possible 
price continues to exist. The fact that the returns to unsecured creditors do not seem 
lower than in a normal business rescue and that connected parties may be willing to 
offer the highest price, are no indication of value-optimisation. This, combined with 
the powerful position of the secured creditors, the risk that not all information is 
available and the statutory duties of the administrator makes it hard for the 
administrator to form a substantiated judgment on whether the sale price is as high 
as reasonably possible. Moreover, interested competitors may not be involved in the 
process where this might have been possible, which also likely affects the price. 
Lastly, even if creditors were to successfully mount a challenge, this does not affect 
the transaction and competition still loses out. One may consider that the pre-pack 
pool is a necessary addition to this system of ex post transparency. Similarly, the 
stance of the RPBs may prove a crucial incentive for the administrator to act 
innovatively and independent of the transferring parties. As of yet, however, the 
effectiveness of these measures remain to be seen. Consequently, the sale process in 
the UK pre-pack may lead to the purchaser being given a (considerable) competitive 
advantage.  
Cherry-Picking Ongoing Contracts 
When a company is liquidated all contracts with the company, such as supplier and 
customer contracts and leases, automatically come to an end. Moreover, the 
liquidator has the power to disclaim onerous property, which normally includes such 
                                                 
120 Nils Elner, ‘The End of Pre-packs? An Analysis of the Legal Landscape in which Pre-packs Operate 
and the Failures of Graham’s Proposals – Part One’ (2016) ICR 116, 122. 
121 Reynolds and Manning (n 100) 2; John Wood, ‘The Sun is Setting: Is it  Time to Legislate Pre-packs?’ 
(2016) 67(2) NILQ 174, available at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852318> 
accessed 26 September 2017, 14. 
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contracts.122 Furthermore, as novation is necessary,123 contracts that were previously 
unfavourable can be re-negotiated, possibly to the benefit of the insolvent party.124 
It has been argued that in a pre-pack, the (connected-party) purchaser is able to 
‘cherry-pick’ beneficial contracts and terminate those that are unfavourable.125 This 
gives the purchaser a competitive advantage over solvent competitors who have to 
deal with their counterparties on the basis of general contract law.126  
Though being able to include ongoing contracts in restructurings can be said to be a 
cornerstone of corporate rescue in the UK,127 the pre-pack indeed seems to enable 
riding roughshod over the interests of these long-term creditors, thereby upsetting 
the balance between the interests of the debtor and those of these creditors.128 
Notably, many contracts provide for automatic termination or the right to terminate 
in the event an administrator is appointed or a scheme of arrangements or company 
voluntary arrangement is proposed. Such ipso facto clauses are valid under UK law 
and, as they concern variation rights, are unaffected by a moratorium.129 
Consequently, if the administrator wishes to avoid termination he will usually need 
to discharge accruing liabilities as they fall due, which is heavily criticised for 
hampering any rescue attempt.130 However, this crucial safeguard is bypassed in the 
pre-pack as the clause cannot be effectively triggered since the business is sold 
immediately after going into administration.131 Consequently, even if the ipso facto-
clause provides for automatic termination of the contract when the admin istration  
procedure is commenced, the pre-pack takes away the possibility for counterparties 
to ensure a beneficial result; the upper ground to negotiate the terms of novation lays 
with the debtor that is no longer in economic distress.132 Similarly, the burdensome 
route for administrators to terminate ongoing contracts as agent of the company in 
                                                 
122 s178(3) IA 1986. 
123 eg Aktion Maritime Corp of Liberia v S Kasmas and Brothers [1987] 1 Lloyds Rep 283 (QBD). 
124 De Ranitz (n 22) 192-193. 
125 eg BPIF Response (n 10) Q26 and BEC Sixth Report 2008-09 (n 10) 11-12; cf Onno Tacoma and 
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129 cf Re David Meek Plant Ltd [1993] BCC 175 (Ch); ibid 131. 
130 Bork (n 127) 195; ibid 132; cf Association of Business Recovery Professionals (R3), ‘Holding Rescue 
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B1 IA 1986 para 66. 
131 Also ibid 3. 
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the normal administration process is evaded,133 and the same applies to the costly 
classification of claims accrued in administration as expenses of the administration  
in case of affirmation.134 
However, it must be noted that, generally, trade creditors and important customers 
hold a strong position in any restructuring, as their contracts are often crucial to the 
continuation of the business in distress. Such creditors often demand ransom 
payments and/or payment in full for the contract to continue.135 The administrator 
often has to make an effort to ensure these contracts are novated as this will normally  
be a necessary part of the deal for the buyer.136 This decreases the risk of 
anticompetitive cherry-picking. However, as the important leverage of ipso facto 
clauses of creditors is absent in a pre-pack, this places the creditor in a more 
precarious position than the now healthy debtor, since declining to novate the 
contract would cause them to lose a viable customer that is perhaps hard to replace. 
For example, landlords are often unable to find a better tenant and are therefore 
normally willing to novate the lease with a NewCo.137 Moreover, it is relevant to 
note that the decision to start such negotiations lies with the debtor; if the pre-pack 
would inevitably lead to the loss of crucial contracts, the pre-pack may simply not 
be considered.138 
Concluding, the prospect of being worse off in liquidation seems particularly true 
for normally well-placed139 long-term creditors if confronted with a pre-pack. 
Therefore, the pre-pack may give a definite competitive advantage over solvent 
competitors through the possibility to cherry-pick or renegotiate ongoing contracts 
to the detriment of the long-term creditors, though the way the bargaining positions 
of the creditors and the debtor fit in with each other will likely depend on the specific 
circumstances of a case. Moreover, this may have another negative consequence on 
competitors, as the suppliers may tighten credit terms to all companies on the 
downstream market to protect themselves from similar losses in the future.140 In any 
case, the risk of a suboptimal sale price is certainly not the only issue for 
competitors.141 
                                                 
133 See eg Bork (n 127) 188-190. 
134 See Rule 2.67(1)(a) Insolvency Rules 1986; ibid 191-192. 
135 R3 Report (n 130) 1-3. 
136 eg Hyde and White (n 65) 135. 
137 Sam Woods, ‘Pre-Pack Owner Fails to Secure Lease’, < https://wolferstans.com/pre-pack-owner-fails-
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Tactical Treatment of Employees  
As noted in the introduction, it is alleged that pre-packing parties can deal with 
employees more flexibly than solvent competitors who are bound to the regular 
provisions of labour law, which gives the purchaser another competitive 
advantage.142 Moreover, the claims of the employees left behind are largely taken 
over by the public funds to which those competitors contribute.143 
Statistics show that the pre-pack has a relatively high level of employment  
preservation, though Graham expresses caution with regard to the veracity of these 
numbers.144 Like the unsecured creditors, employees are given notice of the pre-pack 
as a fait accompli. The information and consultation obligations (currently) flowing  
from EU law145 are consistently ignored by the administrator, taking for granted the 
consequent protective awards 146 due to time constraints and necessary 
confidentiality.147 Moreover, as the worker protection regime in the UK is generally 
seen as conflicting with the rescue regime,148 in a business rescue employers 
normally want to limit employee liabilities as these are factored in the purchase 
price.149 Consequently, despite the relatively high degree of employment 
preservation, concerns have been expressed over the degree of employee protection 
in the UK pre-pack.150 The employee regime applicable to the pre-pack may yet 
constitute a competitive advantage over solvent competitors who – even in a business 
transfer – do not have the same tools to deal with surplus or unwanted employees. 
Therefore, this paragraph examines the veracity of these criticisms.151 First, the 
possibilities of dismissal are examined. Then, the regime on contract variations is 
discussed. 
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Tactical Dismissals 
The employment contracts of all employees will normally automatically transfer 
with the business due to the (current) applicability of the Acquired Rights Directive 
(‘ARD’),152 as implemented in the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of 
Employment) Regulations (‘TUPE’),153 which aims to ensure that employees do not 
find themselves in a less favourable position by reason of a business transfer.154 The 
main insolvency exception of the ARD, which allows Member States to disapply the 
rules on automatic transfer and unfair dismissal to insolvency proceedings instituted 
with a view to the liquidation of the assets (the ‘liquidation exception’), does not 
apply to pre-packs (and administration generally).155 Therefore, a dismissal for 
which the sole or principal reason was the transfer itself is automatically unfair, 
except where the dismissal is for an ‘economic, technical or organisational reason 
entailing changes in the workforce’ (‘ETO-reason’).156 This can be interpreted as a 
genuine business reason or redundancy. Prior to the 2014 amendments, reasons 
connected with the transfer also fell under this dismissal regime.157 
It has been argued that this degree of protection gives employees necessary 
protection, as the purchaser would otherwise be able to cherry-pick the employees 
wanted, clear of accrued rights.158 On the other hand, as abovementioned, this regime 
may yet give the pre-packing parties a competitive advantage. Firstly, as the first 
mechanism of compensation for disapplying the liquidation exception to, inter alia, 
pre-packs, which is thus unavailable to solvent companies, the ARD limits the 
employee claims that transfer to the purchaser.159 Secondly, the provisions of TUPE 
can allegedly be constructed creatively to create other possibilities to get rid of 
unwanted employees in light of a transfer, crucially to increase the value and 
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attractiveness of the business.160 These criticised provisions concern pre-transfer 
dismissals and dismissals for ETO-reasons. 
Firstly, transferring parties and the administrator may escape the scope of TUPE by 
effecting dismissals prior to the transfer. After a lingering debate, the CJEU ruled 
that any dismissal by reason of the transfer, regardless of its timing, was to be 
ineffective.161 This was codified in TUPE 2006 by extending the coverage to 
employees who would have been employed immediately before the transfer were it 
not for an unfair dismissal under Regulation 7(1).162 This resulted in a storm of cases 
in which the UK courts have been unable to give unequivocal guidance on when a 
pre-transfer dismissal falls under the scope of TUPE.163 In a business rescue it would 
depend on the (often unclear) facts of a case whether the transfer or a reason 
connected to the transfer would be deemed to be the sole or principal reason, or 
whether the dismissal was deemed to be part of the general, cost -minimising  
restructuring carried out by the administrator.164 However, as said, the ‘gold-
plating’165 threshold of transfer-connectivity has been removed, thereby arguably 
also removing the greatest protection of employees against unfair dismissals.166 It is 
envisaged that employees may have a hard time proving a pre-transfer dismissal was 
effected by principal reason of the transfer instead of by a general restructuring 
reason.167 Notably, whereas dismissals effected before the identification of a buyer 
have been ruled to be for a reason connected to the transfer, it has been doubted that 
such dismissals will be deemed to principally be by reason of the transfer.168 
Crucially, in a pre-pack employees may struggle to prove, on the basis of SIP 16 
reports only, that a purchaser was found at the time of the dismissal. 
Secondly, as aforementioned, employees may be validly dismissed if there is an 
ETO-reason. A crucial question is how this concept is interpreted in case of a 
business rescue and thus a pre-pack. Both the ARD and the CJEU have given little  
guidance on this concept. It has been argued that the UK courts have, on occasion, 
been judicially creative to ensure that the award for compensation for unfair 
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dismissal was avoided where this would have disproportionately affected the 
functioning of the undertaking post-transfer.169 However, over the last years it has 
been ruled reasonably consistently that, in circumstances where rescue is envisaged, 
the ETO-reason must be to continue conducting the business, not a desire170 or 
necessity171 to achieve a sale.172 Nevertheless, the prospect of rescue has played a 
role in some instances. For example, the court explicitly took into account the future 
conduct of the business in Thomson in dismissals related to overstaffing and 
inefficiency.173 However, this does not change that, generally, there must be a 
genuine economic reason.174 Therefore, although the court is known to accept 
corporate rescue ideals over employment claims at times, it seems that the ETO -
defence does not specifically endanger the position of employees in a pre-pack. 
Variation of Contract 
Lastly, brief mention may be made of the possibility to alter the contracts of 
employees after the transfer. As said, the reproach has been made that, even though 
employment is preserved, the purchaser of the business may be able to force the 
employees to work under altered, less favourable working conditions, similar to the 
way general ongoing contracts may be changed.175 Normally, an employee-
unfavourable variation of contract connected to or by reason of the transfer is void, 
except if for an ETO-reason. This leads to substantial protection of transferred 
employees.176 As the second compensation measure for applying the ARD to 
insolvent business transfers, a special regime, which is thus unavailable to (solvent) 
competitors, on contract variation applies. Employee-unfavourable contract 
variations by reason of the transfer are allowed if agreed on by the transferor, the 
transferee or the insolvency practitioner, and the relevant employee representatives, 
and if they are designed to safeguard employment by ensuring the survival of the 
business.177 
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The potential of this bargaining mechanism, which is undoubtedly present,178 is 
submitted to be limited by the weak UK framework of employee representation.179 
The aforementioned representatives can either be representatives of the recognised 
trade unions or, when there is no such union, those chosen by the employees.180 
Besides the time-costly ad hoc arrangements reducing the time available for actual 
consultations,181 the independence and expertise of those elected is questionable as 
there are no restrictions on who can be elected, which is especially problematic in 
complicated insolvency situations.182 Therefore, this approach, which is 
unfortunately usually applicable due to the decline in unionism,183 seems to render 
the possibility of ‘concession bargaining’184 ineffective.185 This causes the majority 
of leverage and control to be left with the employer and is said to incentivise 
abuse.186 Thus, certainly when contrasted with the strict regime on contract 
variations after a ‘normal’ transfer outside of insolvency, the possibility to alter 
contractual terms may give the transferee another competitive advantage that is 
unavailable to solvent competitors.  
Interim Conclusion 
Even though TUPE applies to pre-packs, several possibilities remain through which 
the transferring parties can rid themselves of unwanted employees in ways that non -
insolvent business transfers cannot, thereby giving the former a competitive 
advantage. Although the general ETO-shield does not seem to currently form a 
danger, the potential of early dismissal seems real, as it appears the dragging debate 
on whether and when early dismissals fall under the scope of TUPE has taken a turn 
towards rescue. Moreover, even if employees cannot be dismissed, there is arguably 
a legitimate risk that employers can pressure employees into accepting less 
favourable terms of employment via the ‘concession bargaining’ derogation. 
Therefore, although not evident at first sight, it  is submitted that, as regards 
employees, the pre-pack, like administration generally, is likely to give another and 
potentially considerable competitive advantage that is unavailable to solvent 
companies. Moreover, whether the UK will review the TUPE-provisions post-Brexit  
remains to be determined. Due to the influence of EU law in this field, if the UK 
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does return to more employer-friendly times the anticompetitive elements of 
business rescue, and consequently the pre-pack, will surely increase. 
Counterfactual Analysis and Consequent Failure 
It was found above that a lack of alternative, less anticompetitive routes of action in 
case of insolvency as well as the future viability of a business sold are important 
considerations in deciding whether the competitive advantages may lead to 
unjustifiable competitor harm. Therefore, these two elements are applied to the pre-
pack. For the sake of this contribution, the counterfactual entails a ‘normal’ business 
rescue out of administration.187 
Counterfactual Analysis 
It is stressed that many characteristics of the pre-pack stem from the generic 
administration procedure or even corporate rescue in general. Therefore, the 
competitive advantages are, to some extent, the same regardless of the rescue 
procedure chosen.188 However, with regard to the risk of a suboptimal deal a crucial 
difference between the pre-pack and the counterfactual can be found in the secrecy 
and consequent lack of market exposure. While such a prepared, private sale is also 
a possibility in a normal business rescue, the pre-pack is the designed procedure for 
this course of action.189 It was explained above that, since the value of the business 
does not plummet due to this secrecy and consequent lack of public exposure as is 
the case in a normal restart, the pre-pack should generate added value over a normal 
restart that should be reflected in the sale price. However, it was also found that, as 
an inherent risk of this secrecy, this may not occur optimally or at all and this surplus 
is then received by the purchaser or another connected party. Thus, whereas a public 
bidding process in principle leads to a market-conforming price,190 however low it 
may be, this is less certain in a pre-pack. Therefore, it may be argued that, as regards 
the sale process, the pre-pack has a higher risk to be anticompetitive than a normal 
business rescue subject to open market exposure. 
The different level of secrecy also influences the bargaining position of the debtor 
as regards ongoing contracts. It was discussed that, as the business is only in 
administration very briefly, there is no issue as regards balancing the need to 
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continue the contracts and the costs of doing so. This issue does exist in a normal 
business rescue as the administrator is only confronted with the bus iness after the 
formal insolvency procedure has been opened. Moreover, it was explained that, as 
opposed to a normal business rescue, guarantees and insolvency clauses of long term 
creditors are made largely ineffective by the pre-pack, which weakens the bargaining 
position of the counterparties. Similarly, though it is submitted that little difference 
exists with regard to employees when comparing the procedures, the administrator 
does not have to make difficult decisions concerning keeping on or dismissin g 
employees due to the super-priority of their salary post-filing as the negotiations on 
the sale do not take place during the formal insolvency procedure.191 
Lastly, it must not be forgotten that, even if many aspects of the pre-pack and the 
counterfactual are the same, the pre-pack is undoubtedly a more effective procedure 
in many scenarios, which is hence the reason of its popularity. As was seen, effects 
on competition are inherent to corporate rescue. The simple increase in usage and 
effectiveness of this corporate rescue procedure thus leads to increased relevance for 
competition. 
On the basis of these considerations, the pre-pack is likely to carry more competitive 
advantages than its ‘normal’ business rescue alternative. Moreover, while pre-packs 
can undoubtedly have added value over these alternatives,192 there are also scenarios 
in which a normal business rescue would lead to a similar or even more beneficial 
result for the stakeholders.193 For example, a public process has not been found to be 
detrimental in all sectors.194 Consequently, following the rationale of the failing firm 
defence as discussed above, much of the justifying effect of the pre-pack, on both 
the stakeholders and the market, may be invalidated if a pre-pack is pursued when a 
normal business rescue is also possible. Above, it was found that this risk indeed 
exists. Secured creditors may prompt the debtor into researching the pre-pack in 
practice, whereby the administrator, due to his statutory duties, may not be in a 
position to effectively research whether a normal business rescue would be more 
appropriate as without the cooperation of the secured lenders the company would 
likely end in liquidation. Moreover, the decision to pre-pack is not scrutinised by the 
pre-pack pool.195 These considerations lead to the conclusion that, depending of the 
specifics of a particular pre-pack, the alleged justifying benefits of the pre-pack for 
the market and/or the stakeholders must be nuanced. 
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Consequent Failure 
As explained above, the future viability of the pre-packed business is an important 
consideration for competition, as the initial positive effect of a pre-pack on the 
market is negated if the company goes on to fail again. Graham found that, 
statistically, connected-party sales have an appreciably higher chance to 
subsequently fail than non-connected sales.196 Moreover, the failure rates of pre-
packs were found to be higher than normal business rescues due to the relatively  
high level of connected-party sales and deferred consideration payments.197 Graham 
notes that it is not the pre-pack itself that leads to the higher level of failure, but the 
self-standing characteristics associated with failure of connected-party sales and 
deferred consideration.198 Nevertheless, one could argue that these elements are 
factual characteristics of the pre-pack and thus do make pre-packs stand out 
significantly with regard to consequent failure.199 Moreover, Graham found that, for 
various reasons, deferred consideration is often not paid in full.200 This may give the 
purchaser yet another competitive advantage. 
Due to these high rates of consequent failure, Graham recommended the instalment 
of a voluntary viability review in connected-party sales in the ‘comply-or-explain ’ 
system of SIP 16, in which the administrator has to encourage the connected party 
to draw up a ‘viability review’ on the new company, explaining how it will survive 
for at least 12 months.201 It aims to reduce the amount of unviable businesses re-
entering the market or the same management or business plan failing  yet again. 
However, there seems to have been little use of the viability reviews up to now, 
which may be attributed to the fact that it is unclear what exactly it should comprise 
and when it should be employed.202 Notably, the broadly-framed requirements 
allegedly require no more than a simple business plan, which does not give any 
guarantees on future viability.203 Moreover, after 12 months most subsequently 
failing businesses are still viable.204 Furthermore, the viability review suffers from 
the same deficit as the UK pre-pack generally: any justification on why such a 
statement was not issued is hard to scrutinise and to challenge. As such, the 
effectiveness of the viability review is questionable.205 Similarly, though Graham 
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states that (the lack of) the viability statement can be used as ammunition for 
directors’ liability if the NewCo fails,206 the deterring effect thereof on connected-
party sales remains doubtful. 
The Balancing Act Revisited 
Synthesis 
Due to the flexibility enjoyed by pre-packing parties as regards the sale price, 
ongoing contracts and employees, a pre-pack can place the rescued business in a 
competitively advantageous position and consequently have considerable negative 
effects on competitors. Moreover, due to their specific working, pre-packs carry the 
risk of being more anticompetitive than their respective ‘normal’ business rescue 
alternatives, crucially due to the consequences of a wholly private sale process as 
opposed to a more public, market-conforming one. In this regard, the competitors’ 
concerns are justified. However, the question remains whether this harm outweighs 
the gains of a pre-pack. It is recognised without a doubt that the pre-pack can be an 
effective means to restructure an insolvent business. Furthermore, as is in alignment 
with the failing firm defence-rationale, a successful pre-pack is likely to have a 
positive effect on the market and the consumer. This is notably due to the 
preservation of a viable competitor on the market. Yet, when reading the working of 
the pre-pack in light of the theoretical framework provided in this contribution, 
several worrisome observations can be put forward. Firstly, pre-packs do not by 
definition benefit the market and the consumer. Though it is hard to make such 
statements without economic research, a legitimate concern for the new creditors, 
the employees as well as the market is present when the company goes on to fail 
again. This is found to be a substantial issue. Secondly, the ever-looming ‘bad apple’ 
cases, where the business is sold (far) below market value, are likely to be seriously 
detrimental to competitors and possibly also consumers. This is due to the 
improvement of the market position of the purchaser as a result of the lack of 
required investment in combination with, in the likely case of a connected-party sale, 
a high degree of debt-shedding. Notably, even if liability can be imposed, the 
competitor harm cannot be remedied. Thirdly, if the viable route of a less 
anticompetitive alternative has not been taken, this negates, to some extent, the 
justifying effect for both the economic stakeholders and the market. On the basis of 
these considerations, it is submitted that, in theory, a pre-pack can be unjustifiably 
anticompetitive. 
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The Way Forward 
This conclusion does not automatically mean pre-packs distort the balance between 
competition and insolvency law. A few potentially bad apple cases do not condemn 
the pre-pack207 and the identified competition issues do not alter this. Therefore, it is 
submitted that research on the economic effects of pre-packs on competitors and the 
market is desirable.208 Such research would grant a better insight into how many pre-
packs genuinely economically harm competitors, and on what kind  of markets.209 
This would also give more clarity on the likelihood of pre-packs having a positive 
effect on the market and the consumer. For example, Graham found that small 
companies are the predominant users of the pre-pack,210 which may affect both the 
degree of competitor harm and consumer welfare. Additionally, economic research 
would shed more light on how the found anticompetitive elements weigh in against 
each other, as there is no guarantee that a pre-pack that has several severely 
anticompetitive elements is anticompetitive in all its aspects. Moreover, this could 
indicate whether perhaps only the often problematic connected-party pre-packs form 
a genuine concern for competition. Lastly, finding that competitors suffer 
considerable economic harm in a substantial amount of cases could ignite a 
discussion on the anticompetitive effects of other business rescues procedures, or 
even corporate rescue in general. 
Final Thoughts  
Blatantly concluding that pre-packs are a form of unjustifiable anticompetitive 
behaviour would ignore the difficult though inherent relation between the insolvency 
and competition doctrines. Yet, this contribution aims to have shown that more 
awareness should be had of the competition side-effects of pre-packs. Preferable, 
steps are taken to research the economic effects of pre-packs on both competitors 
and the market. Only then can more substantial conclusions be drawn on the impact  
of pre-packs – or corporate rescue generally – on the balance between competition 
and insolvency law. Moreover, decreasing the number of potentially anticompetitive 
pre-packs can be achieved, inter alia, via emphasising crucial, existing safeguards 
as identified in this contribution. Prominent examples are the pre-pack pool and the 
viability review.211 On a more general note, scrutinising pre-packs from the point of 
view of competition has emphasised the need for safeguards. This goes for several 
areas already central to the pre-pack discussion, such as the sale process and the 
                                                 
207 cf Elner (n 83) 171. 
208 cf Paulus (n 1) 75 and BEC Sixth Report 2008-09 (n 10) 11-12. 
209 cf Walton (n 20) 8-9. 
210 Graham Report (n 9) 23. 
211 For suggestions on altering existing or introducing new safeguards, such as the ‘stalking horse’ bidding 
procedure, see eg Vullings (n 49) 59, 63. 
  VAN SCHADEWIJK: Pre-Packing in the UK 
position of employees. Yet, areas that are less in the spotlight are also pinpointed, 
such as the treatment of ongoing contracts, the decision to pre-pack and the future 
viability of the going concern. With regard to employees, the competition dimension 
moreover encompasses an extra warning to closely scrutinise the treatment of 
employees by the UK insolvency regime post-Brexit. 
The development of the rescue culture, with the pre-pack as a preeminent example, 
has undoubtedly shifted the scales between the doctrines of competition and 
insolvency law. In light of the European-wide ‘restructuring euphoria’212 
competition implications of corporate rescue are more relevant than ever. One 
should be wary of creating a business environment in which corporate rescue can be 
used as a ‘business tool’ that circumvents the Darwinian process of competition. The 
anticompetitive effects of the procedure may become its object and this irksome 
balance may be forgotten altogether. If business rescue continues to grow in 
popularity, companies may, for example in a future financial crisis, try and use 
business rescue as a strategic business tool and perhaps even relocate to the most 
easily approachable jurisdiction for that purpose.213 Alternatively, the trust in the 
insolvency system may be lost and the system may fall into disrepute and misuse.214 
In any case, it should be remembered that ‘competition is not only the basis of 
protection to the consumer, but is the incentive to progress’.215 
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